Abstract-This paper presents a novel distributed control strategy for large-scale deployment of price-responsive flexible demand. Differently from previous theoretical studies on the subject, the proposed analysis explicitly models multi-area systems, accounting for transmission lines of limited capacity and different locational marginal prices (LMP) throughout the network. A game-theoretic framework is adopted, designing a demand coordination scheme that converges to a stable market configuration (characterized as an aggregative equilibrium) through iterative price broadcasts. The performance of the proposed control strategy, that also ensures flattened generation profiles and reduced generation costs, is evaluated in simulation on a five-bus power system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing diffusion of new types of loads, such as electric vehicles and smart appliances, represents a crucial element in the ongoing transition of power systems towards the smart grid paradigm. The resulting increased flexibility in the power consumption of private customers could potentially be exploited for multiple purposes, such as energy cost reduction for domestic households or ancillary services provision for the system [1], [2] . Many distributed schemes have been proposed in the literature to achieve these benefits by properly coordinating flexible demand [3] .
Within this context, a significant amount of research has focused on game-theoretic approaches for interruptible appliances, modelling the flexible devices as price-responsive rational agents that compete for power consumption at times with cheaper energy. For example, [4] proposes an iterative auction mechanism that coordinates the charging of electric vehicles so as to converge to an equilibrium at which both the benefit of each customer and the social welfare are maximized. A similar iterative pricing scheme is presented in [5] , where the overnight demand valley is filled at the final stable market configuration. These approaches have been extended in multiple directions, evaluating alternative schemes for convergence to equilibrium [6] , [7] , considering more detailed models of the appliances [8] or proposing coordination schemes with incomplete information [9] . Note that all the cited papers [4] - [9] consider an abstraction of the electricity market where the 978-1-5386-4505-5/18/$31.00 © 2018 IEEE electricity price is simply characterized as some monotone increasing function of total demand. Moreover, they do not consider the impact of flexible demand operation at a transmission level, which is a relevant factor in large-scale applications.
This paper advances the state-of-the-art in flexible demand coordination by addressing the above shortcomings. A novel control strategy for multi-area systems is proposed, explicitly accounting for transmission lines of limited capacity and analytically quantifying the impact of flexible demand on the locational marginal prices (LMP). Using the theoretical framework in [7] as a starting point, it is proved that the proposed scheme always converges to a stable market configuration (characterized as an aggregative equilibrium) for all penetration levels and parameters of the flexible devices. The capability of the proposed strategy to flatten generation profiles and reduce system costs is tested in simulation, considering a 5-bus system with high penetration of electric vehicles.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II contains the main modelling elements of the flexible devices and the power system. Section III and Section IV present, respectively, the proposed control strategy and case studies. Conclusive remarks are provided in Section V.
II. MODELLING FRAMEwORK
The considered power system is composed of a finite set X = {I, . (I) indicates that the total energy consumed by device j is equal to the energy required to complete its task while the inequalities impose that its positive power consumption cannot exceed the rated power Pj for t within the availability interval d j and must be zero 
(5b)
jEW e wish to design an iterative distributed control scheme that ensures convergence to a stable configuration, characterized as the aggregative equilibrium notion defined below:
Definition 1: Consider the individual power profiles uj, the demand vector D* and the prices p* and p*. These quantities correspond to an aggregative equilibrium if, for any area k E X, any agent j E Ak andany feasible profile Uj E UZlj , it holds: D. To account for the points DE~of non-differentiability, we introduce the quantities E!k and Pb defined as follows:
The price i5k represents the marginal cost of providing an additional unit of power in area k, while Pk is the marginal saving of reducing by one unit the power supplied to area k. 
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Game-theoretic formulation and aggregative equilibrium
Coordination of flexible demand is analyzed under a gametheoretic framework. Each device j in area k is modelled as a rational agent that aims to minimize its cost Cj,k. Denoting by i5k(t) the k-th element of the price vector (6b), we have:
subject to:
A. Optimal Power Flow and Locational Marginal Prices
The electricity price Pk in each area k E X = {I, ... K} of the power system corresponds to the LMP associated to an optimal power flow problem. For simplicity, a DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) with no losses is considered. This choice is common in analytical works on multi-area systems, as it ensures satisfying approximations and efficient computability [10] . To present an analytical formulation, we for a certain demand vector D, subject to power balance constraints (3a), transmission line limits (3b) and generation limits (3c). This can be expressed as:
G~in ::; Gk ::; G~ax (3c) for k, k' = 1,2, ... , K. Note that fk( Gk) represents the cost of generating G k power units in area k and it is assumed to be a strictly convex function, Pk is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint (3a), whereas Xkk' and Fmfx denote the reactance d h · .ã n te maximum capacity, respectively, of the transmission line connecting areas k and k'. In order to formally characterize the electricity prices used in the subsequent analysis, some preliminary properties of the DCOPF are demonstrated. Proof' Given the maximum theorem under convexity [11], this proposition follows from the convexity of fk and the linearity and convexity of the constraints in (3).
•
From Proposition 1, <p(D) is Lipschitz continuous on any open
interval (Dmin,Dmax)K and differentiable almost everywhere, except for some zero-measure set~C (Dmin,Dmax)K [12] . The sub-differential of <p(D) is now introduced:
The aggregative equilibrium is expressed as a fixed point.
From (9), if any device j EAkin some area k E X changes its power profile uj (at equilibrium) to some other power profile uj, the corresponding variation IV of its cost will be non-negative. This cost variation is the difference between the costs of increased power consumption at certain time instants (priced at pZ) and the savings from reduced power consumption at other times(priced at pk). From (10), the aggregate power consumption of flexible demand associated to the power profiles uj of all devices j E Ak will in turn lead to very same price profiles pZ and pZ considered in (9) .
The aggregative equilibrium is a good approximation of the classical Nash equilibrium notion when single agents have negligible impact on the global quantities of the system and can therefore be considered as price-taking entities. This is reasonable in the present case since the power consumption Uj of a single device (in the order of KWs) is significantly smaller than total power demand (GWs). Note that the proposed formulation still takes into account the overall impact of the devices population through (10) . Similar equilibrium notions are commonly adopted as design objective in analytical studies on flexible demand coordination [5] , [7] .
III. DISTRIBUTED CONTROL STRATEGY
The proposed scheme for coordination of flexible demand is presented in Algorithm 1. As discussed next, its implementation in practical contexts can be performed in a distributed manner through iterative price broadcasts and repeated power updates by the flexible devices. It is proven in Theorem 1 that such scheme always converges to a stable market configuration, i.e. to an aggregative equilibrium. The three main phases of Algorithm I are now described. I) Initialization: The central entity collects the feasible power consumption profiles uj O) that have been initially scheduled by each device. On the basis of this information, it calculates the resulting aggregate demand profile DiO) and price profiles pia) and pia) in each area k E X. The iteration counter 1 and the flag variable flag are initialized. The latter is used to detect whether a change in power scheduling has occurred at the latest iteration in phase 2.
2) Power scheduling update: The power scheduling is modified in succession from Area I to Area K (Step 2.b). The devices within a certain area k sequentially update their power profiles (Step 2.c). When a single device j updates its power profile ujl), all other devices retain their strategies from the previous iteration (Step 2.c.ii). The device j verifies whether it can switch a feasible amount~of its power consumption from a time t2 with a higher electricity price to a time t1 with a lower price (Step 2.c.iii), thus reducing its energy cost. If this is the case, the power swap is performed (the power profile ujl) is updated), and the power amount~switched from t2 to t1 will be communicated to the central entity, which will in turn
2) Power scheduling update
iii) FIND t, ,t2 E J21j such that:
.: If there is no feasible power swap, the variable flag remains equal to 0 (step 2.a) throughout the two nested FOR cycles. The WHILE cycle consequently terminates.
3) Final results: At the end of the WHILE cycle, the values of uj/), Di'), pi') and pi') at the last iteration are returned as the final results uj, DZ, pZ and pZ, for all k E X and all j E Ak.
Note that, if the initial demand DiO) in each area is known or 
The availability window dj of the single device j can now be expressed in discrete time as:
dj={tEg-:ti::;t.~t::;ti+dj}.
(11)
The inflexible demand profile D" in area k is chosen according to historical data [14] . In the initialization phase of the algorithm, it is assumed that the initial power profile U)O) of each EV j corresponds to charging at constant power throughout its whole availability window dj. On the basis of these power profiles, the resulting demand profiles DiO) and price profiles pia) and pia) of all areas are obtained. The final results of the proposed algorithm (WE) are compared with the ones obtained with a price-greedy strategy (PG) and the case of no EVs (NoE). In the PG scenario, EVs will minimize their energy costs in response to the electricity prices obtained by only considering the inflexible demand profiles D".
The demand and price profiles in each area, under the three scenarios, are shown in Fig. 2 . In the PG case, when the EVs simply schedule power consumption in response to the prices of inflexible demand, peaks appear in demand profiles Dr G and consequently in the prices pr G . Conversely, the demand profiles DY: E obtained in the WE case, with the application of the proposed algorithm, are much flatter and the price profiles pY: E are completely flattened between 22:00 and 7:00. Fig. 3 shows the generation profiles in the three scenarios. A similar trend emerges: the generation profiles in the PG case have peaks and oscillations whereas the ones in the WE scenario are completely flat. Fig. 4 shows the power flows on Line 1-2 and Line 4-5, with maximum capacity of 400MW and 240MW, respectively. Line 4-5 is always congested, leading to price differentials between each area. The comparison of the power flows on Line 1-2 shows that the power exchanged between areas has reduced oscillations in the WE case.
Finally, Fig. 5 shows the performance of the proposed strategy (WE case) from a system perspective. Fig. 5a compares the total generation profile G T of the system in the 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed coordination strategy is applied to the PJM 5-bus system [13] , whose topology and parameters are shown in Fig. 1 estimated with sufficient precision, the proposed coordination scheme preserves the privacy of the agents. In fact, they do not need to divulge their parameters (Ej,Pj,dj) but only communicate, at each update, the time instants tl and t2 and the amount~of their power swap.
Remark 2: Faster implementations, with a one-shot broadcast of a price signal and negligible degradation of the equilibrium performance, can alternatively be considered. These are not presented for length reasons but are discussed in [7] for the case of single-area systems.
It is now demonstrated that Algorithm 1 always converges to a stable market configuration, where each device has no interest in unilaterally changing its scheduled power profile.
Theorem 1: For a power system composed of K areas, each endowed with a population of flexible devices, the proposed Algorithm 1 asymptotically converges to the aggregative equilibrium introduced in Definition 1.
Proof See Appendix I.
• The algorithm not only guarantees convergence to an aggregative equilibrium but it also ensures a consistent reduction of the total generation costs. As demonstrated in Appendix I and shown in the simulations of Section IV, the total generation costs of the system are reduced at each iteration of the algorithm and converge asymptotically to some minimum value. In an extended journal version of this work, we demonstrate that this minimum is a global optimum. This reduction implies the asymptotic convergence of C T to some limit value, since CT denotes the total generation cost of the system and is therefore lower bounded. At such value, the algorithm does not perform any additional power swap, since this would correspond to a further cost reduction. As a result, the variable flag remains equal to zero throughout V. CONCLUSION This paper presents a distributed strategy for the coordination of flexible demand in multi-area systems, taking network topology and capacity constraints of transmission lines into account. The strategy converges to a stable market configuration (characterized as an aggregative equilibrium) through iterative price broadcasts and power updates. Simulations are carried out on a five-area system with high penetration of electric vehicles, showing that the proposed strategy can flatten generation profiles and reduce total generation costs. different cases. Note that the total generation (equivalently, total demand) profile G'f£ in the WE case is flat, despite the oscillations of the demand profiles Di/£ in the single areas.
Given the convexity of the generation cost functions fb this result strongly hints to a minimization of total generation costs with the proposed coordination scheme. This is corroborated by Fig. 5b , showing system generation costs CT as a function of the algorithm iteration I, as expressed below:
where D(l) (t) is the demand profile vector at I-th algorithm iteration and cP is the result of the OPF in (2) . As expected from the proof of Theorem I, C¥) decreases at each iteration and reaches a minimum value at the aggregative equilibrium, where the algorithm terminates. Proof of convergence: Consider the total generation cost C¥) at the I-th algorithm iteration, defined in (12) . Firstly, it is verified that the cost CT is reduced at each iteration I of the algorithm in which a power swap is performed: C¥) < C¥-I). Note that (26) and (24) are equivalent to the IF condition at step 2.c.iii of the algorithm. Since the algorithm has terminated and has returned the power scheduling u*, we can conclude that its internal variable flag remains equal to zero in the two nested FOR cycles, implying that (26) and (24) never hold, thus proving (25) and (9) 
qJ (DU) (t 2 )) = qJ (DU-I)(t 2 )) -E~(t 2) .* (18)
Ef)(t2) < E~(t 2) < Ef-I )(t2). 
where the inequality straightly follows from (20). This result proves (13), thus ensuring convergence.
Proof of equilibrium:
It is now shown that the final result u* returned by the algorithm fulfills (9) in Definition I (note that (10) holds by construction) and therefore corresponds to an aggregative equilibrium. To prove (9) , it is useful to consider that any feasible Uj can be expressed as the sum of uj and a finite number Q of feasible power swaps Oq: qJ(DU)(t l )) =qJ(DU-I)(tl)+~*.ek)
=qJ (DU-I)(t l )) + p~(t l ) .*.
Given the strict convexity of qJ established in Proposition and recalling (4) and (5), it holds:
